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Living with Difference: A Forgotten 
Art i n  Urgent Need of ~evival? 
Roger Ballard 
To British observers, the suicide bombings on London's underground on 
7/7/2005 marked as much of an end of an era as did the attack on the 
twin towers on 9/11. The days of liberal multiculturalist appeasement 
appeared to be over. As the Prime Minister put it, the rules of the game had 
changed: diversity had been overindulged; allowed to  go too far. Britain's 
dilemma was deeper than America's: unlike the dissident Arabs who 
slipped into the United States to train as pilots, London's bombers were 
born in Britain. If extremism was an internal threat, it followed that the 
body politic was rotting from within, and tocontain the infection required 
unprecedented initiatives. If that meant backing out of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, or even of habeczs corpus, then so be it. 
Although many aspects of established social policy were overwhelmed 
in the aftermath of the events of 717, the tsunami did not arrive without 
warning. From the publication of Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses 
to the so-called 'Northern cities riots' two decades later, an escalating 
series of incidents provided clear indications that young British Muslims 
were becoming increasingly restless. Moreover their restlessness was of 
a distinctive kind: from the Satanic Verses controversy it was quite clear 
that the underlying contradictions were as much a product of religious 
and cultural issues as those of 'race'. The 'northern riots' of 2001 precip- 
itated a further step-change in policy. The report which was prepared 
in their aftermath, Building Cohesive Commuriities (Cantle 2002), was 
promptly adopted as government policy. Remarkably, the sharp switch 
in emphasis which Cantle recommended attracted heavyweight intel- 
lectual support. As Prospect Magazine argued, 
Lifestyle diversity and high immigration bring cultural and economic 
dynamism, but can erode feelings of mutual obligation.. . In the 
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decades ahead, European politics itself may start to shift on this axis, 
with left and right being eclipsed by value-based culture wars and 
movements for and against diversity. . . .The progressive centre needs 
to think more clearly about these issues to avoid being engulfed by 
them.. . to  that end it must try to develop a new language.. .that 
transcends the thin and abstract language of universal rights on 
the one hand, and the defensive, nativist language of group iden- 
tity on the other.. . People will always favour their own families and 
communities; it is the task of a realistic liberalism to strive for a 
definition of community that is wide enough to include people from 
many different backgrounds, without being so wide as to become 
meaningless. 
(Goodhart 2004) 
At first sight, the 717 explosions confirmed Goodhart and his supporters' 
fears; in their aftermath Britain's 'failed policies of multiculturalism' 
attracted much criticism. Such policies, it was argued, had facilitated 
the emergence of unincorporated communities within which extremism 
thrived unchecked. Britain was adversely compared with France, where 
the policy of laicit6 was comprehensively antithetical to multicultur- 
alism. Since the Republic's citizen are all by definition French, minorities 
remain deliberately unrecognised. Homogeneity is a central objective 
of public policy, and the manifestation of diversity - especially if reli- 
giously grounded - in public is consequently deemed illegitimate. Hence 
in sharp contrast to multicultural Britain where hula1 school dinners 
are widely available and uniform adjustments to cope with minority 
proclivities have become the norm, the French authorities success- 
fully prohibited Muslim pupils from wearing the hijab in state-funded 
schools. Suddenly France came to be admired for its refusal to concede 
to 'divisive' (and hence community-cohesion sapping) demands for 
minority rights. 
Nevertheless, uncritical support for the colour-, religion- and culture- 
blind policy of laicite' did not long survive the events of 717. Four 
months later the banlieue of Clichy-sous-Bois on the outskirts of Pamis - 
in which (largely Muslim) migrants of African origin and their locally 
born offspring were warehoused in soulless high-rise apartment blocks - 
erupted in a series of night-time confrontations between local youth 
and the gendarmen'e. The initial reaction of the authorities was entirely 
dismissive: Interior Minister Sarkozy described the rioters as 'vermin' 
who should be swept away with high pressure hoses. However, his reac- 
tion was read as provocative. As the intifada spread round the banlieues 
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of Paris and then to many provincial cities, the authorities had no  altern- 
ative but to pay attention to the causes of these uprisings. Once peace 
was restored - which did not occur until troops had been called out to 
reinforce the buckling resources of the police - there was widespread 
agreement that new initiatives were required to address the underlying 
issues. We have yet to see whether these will be sufficient to prevent 
further trouble. But so long as the Kepublic's overarching commit- 
ment to laicite' remains unchallenged, there appears to be a substantial 
prospect that further eruptions will occur in due course. 
The challenge of plurality 
France and Britain face similar problems. Like most industrialised coun- 
tries, they experienced a mass influx of non-European migrant workers 
during the years of prosperity which followed the Second World War, 
such that their populations were rendered substantially more diverse 
in ethnic terms. Contrary to widespread (if na'ive) expectations of 
swift assimilation, the resultant patterns of plurality have become a 
permanent feature of the social order. Confusion now reigns over how 
best to respond. Numbers are too large for expulsion to be a realistic 
option, and the final solution of genocide is manifestly off the agenda. 
Yet all the more acceptable solutions - whether framed in terms of anti- 
racism, of multiculturalism or of laicite' - appear to precipitate equally 
unviable outcomes. 
These contradictions are by no means confined to Britain and France. 
Mass migration is now a global phenomenon, and ethnic plurality has 
become the most salient locus of violent conflict in whichever direction 
one looks. Yet the source of these contradictions - the presence of reli- 
gious and cultural plurality within a single social arena - is in no way a 
novel phenomenon. Human society has always been culturally diverse. 
It is easy to see why: members of the species Homo sayiens are unique 
in their capacity to create the terms of their own social existence, and 
hence to be cultured in innumerable differing ways. Likewise our species 
has also always been exceptionally spatially mobile, and just as eager 
to trade. What is novel about the contemporary world is not so much 
the coexistence of persons using differing social, cultural, linguistic, and 
religious conventions to order their lives, but rather the acute feelings 
of discomfort which are now routinely precipitated in circumstances of 
this kind. Contrary to widespread (modern) belief, the explosions which 
now so often occur when those who differ find themselves confronting 
one another are not innate. Rather they stem from our newly entrenched 
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expectation that societies can only be expected to cohere on an orderly 
basis if they are ethnically homogeneous. Given such a mindset, ethnic 
plurality is routinely perceived as an unwelcome and destabilising threat 
to the integrity of the established social order. 
Yet just how accurate is that supposition? Are plural societies neces- 
sarily unstable? Or are our current assumptions merely a consequence 
of having entrapped ourselves within the ideological limitations of 
our taken-for-granted 'presentist' and 'unitarian" expectations? A brief 
historical excursion produces some illuminating results. 
The historical roots of Britain's current condition of I 
ethno-religious plurality S @ 
Most contemporary societies are cross-cut by ethno-religious divisions 
of one kind or another. Some are of such antiquity that they have come 
to be regarded as autochthonous, whilst others are of much more recent 
origin. Britain - or more accurately the United Kingdom - provides 
a clear example of the range of possibilities. Over the millennia the 
indigenous Celtic population of the Atlantic Isles was marginalised by 
successive waves of immigrants. Those who arrived from North Germany 
and Scandinavia came to be defined as Anglo-Saxons, and were in 
turn subordinated by further invaders from Normandy. In the centuries 
that followed these two disparate immigrant groups gradually merged, 
leading to the construction of the Anglo-Norman creole which we now 
know as English. However, English was much more than a language: 
as an ethnic category it provided a vehicle whereby all those resident 
south of the Scottish borders and east of the Welsh marches could close 
ranks, thereby enabling them to differentiate themselves from - and to 
legitimate their hegemony over - those of their predecessors who had 
been relegated to the Celtic periphery. 
Although the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish components of popul- 
ation of the Atlantic Isles were eventually brought together in the United 
Kingdom, the underlying condition of plurality was not eliminated: each 
of the Celtic nations maintained a strong sense of distinctiveness, not 
least because of the England's maintenance of a position of hegemonic 
dominance within the Union. Moreover England's carefully constructed 
condition of internal homogeneity was further overlaid (and hence 
compromised) by successive migrant inflows. These included Huguenots, 
Irish Catholics and Eastern European Jews prior to the two World Wars, 
and the more immediately visible settlers from Asia, Africa and the 
Caribbean thereafter. In other words migration is nothing new to English 
(or British) history; nor is ethnic plurality. Whatever current mythology 
may suggest, both have long been the order of the day. Likewise the arrival 
of newcomers has rarely, if ever, been regarded as welcome by the indi- 
genes. Over and above the additional competition for scarce resources 
which their presence inevitably precipitated, the newcomers' alien beliefs 
and lifestyles were routinely perceived as a threat to the integrity of the 
established cultural, linguistic, and religious order. 
Immigration was only part of that story, however. As a result of 
the systematic changes precipitated by the Henrician and Elizabethan 
reformation, the English became acutely averse to the prospect of plur- 
ality. At an institutional level, the reformation transformed England into 
one of the world's first nation-states. Having disengaged his kingdom 
from papal imprimatur, Henry's state required a new source of legit- 
imation. He and his associates found it in the English nation, which 
was held to have manifested itself in its people, its language, it Parlia- 
ment and its Church - of which Henry promptly proclaimed himself 
the head. Henceforward the English were in a position to identify them- 
selves as body of people united in their linguistic, cultural, and religious 
homogeneity, free of subjugation by their external enemies (especially 
in the shape of Spain, France and behind them the Pope), and answer- 
able only to the authority of the Crown in Parliament. A nation-state, 
no less. 
All this had far-reaching socio-political consequences. In the context 
of this explicitly non-plural dispensation, it followed that anyone who 
failed to accept the theological principles of the Church of England 
could be labelled a (political) traitor no less than a (religious) heretic. 
As a result the so-called 'recusants' - those who doggedly resisted the 
new dispensation by maintaining their commitment to the Catholic 
faith - were in constant danger of harassment. Whilst dissidents were 
promptly burned at the stake for their pains, most, usually as the result 
of a very public refusal to conform to the requirements of the regime, 
simply lowered their profile, keeping their Catholic commitments as 
private as possible. Even so, the resultant de facto condition of religious 
plurality was an implicit challenge to England's normative commitment 
to comprehensive uniformity. What was to be done, given that efforts 
to eliminate all such deviance would risk something akin to civil war? 
A solution was eventually found in the regularly renewed Test Acts. 
These required all those seeking public office or entry to the Universities 
of Oxford and Cambridge to swear an oath of allegiance which was 
composed in such a way that it would only be acceptable to those of an 
Anglican persuasion. So it was that a substantial minority of England's 
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population - some indigenous (as in the case of Catholic recusants) and 
others of immigrant origin (as in the case of Jews and Huguenots) - were 
reduced to the position of second-class subjects, a position from which 
they were not formally 'emancipated' until 1831,2 following several 
decades of acrimonious debate. 
Emancipation did not resolve the underlying issues. When the Act was 
passed no one was aware of the extent to which the industrial revolu- 
tion was about to transform the British social order. In the decades that 
followed Britain's industrial cities grew at an unprecedented speed, and 
once the resources of the surrounding countryside had been exhausted, 
their insatiable demand for additional labour led to millions of migrant 
workers being drawn in from further afield. The arrival of Irish and 
Eastern European settlers rendered Britain's cities steadily more plural, 
no less in religious and ethnic terms. The English socio-religious order 
had been rendered more plural than ever before, and conflict over the 
issue soon became acute. As Karl Marx - himself a German Jewish immig- 
rant - observed, 
Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses 
a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians 
and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish 
worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to 
the Irish worker he regards himself as a member of the rulivig nation 
and consequently he becomes a tool of the Engiish aristocrats and 
capitalists against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over 
himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against 
the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that 
of the 'poor whites' to the Negroes in the former slave states of the 
U.S.A. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. 
He sees in the English worker both the accomplice and the stupid 
tool of the English rulers in Ireland. 
This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, 
the pulpit, the comic papers, in short, by all the means at the disposal 
of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of 
the English working class, despite its organisation. It is the secret by 
which the capitalist class maintains its power. 
(Marx 187011975: 220) 
Most latter-day Marxists have interpreted this final observation as an 
indication that ethnic conflict is best understood as the outcome of 
cynical efforts by the ruling class to divide and rule the opposition. 
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However, closer reading of the text promptly reveals that whilst Marx 
was well aware of the likelihood of such developments, it was analyt- 
ically irresponsible to halt the argument at that point. By expanding 
his analysis to include a consideration of how the dialectics of imperial 
and racial inequality can intersect with - and in doing so undermine - 
the contradictions of class, he develops the argument still further, and 
in doing so develops a further point which remains as relevant as ever: 
that when ethnic antagonisms come to the boil, all contending parties 
can be expected to pursue their own interests, whether as 'poor whites' 
seeking to maintain their position of privilege over former slaves, or as 
Irish Fenians busy repaying English workers in their own terms. 
Marx's point is crucial. 'Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, ethnic contradictions were at least as salient a feature of 
British working-class experience as were those of class. When Churches 
and Synagogues became defensive rallying points for Irish and Jewish 
migrants, they immediately became the foci for attacks by English 
workers. Riots frequently ensued. Education also became a battleground, 
given the Church of England's stranglehold over the curriculum of 
publicly funded schools. Hence when Catholics finally managed to gain 
public support for a separate educational system of their own, the initi- 
ative was promptly criticised as 'Papism on the rates' (Fielding 1993). 
During the course of the twentieth century this particular disjunction 
has gradually faded, so much so that it is now a pale shadow of its former 
self. Whilst the Orange order once flourished in most of Britain's indus- 
trial cities, today its presence is felt only in 1,iverpool and Glasgow, and 
of course in Ulster. But if the existence of this ethno-religious disjunc- 
tion has gradually been excised from public discourse, so much so that 
it has successfully been replaced with a myth of proletarian unity, the 
underlying issues have in no way disappeared. English hostility towards 
Catholic and Jewish presence may indeed have declined sharply during 
the course of the past half century - but only because a new set of targets 
for popular xenophobia have appeared to replace them. 
Although structurally similar to their predecessors, Britain's current ' 
patterns of ethno-religious polarisation nevertheless include some 
distinctive features. First, the latest waves of newcomers are easier to 
target, given their physical identifiability; secondly, the religious and 
cultural traditions which they brought with them differ much more 
sharply from indigenous ideas and practices than did those of their 
predecessors. Hence whilst the reactions to their arrival, including 
their coilective allocation to a status of second-class citizenship, is a 
close match with established precedent, the additional dimensions of 
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distinctiveness which the newcomers have introduced are such that 
contradictions let loose by their arrival are proving to be particularly 
severe. 
A changing world 
During the latter part of the twentieth century the structure of the global 
order has changed radically. Three interlinked developments have been 
of particular importance. First, the collapse of European empires - of 
which Britain's was by far the largest - in the aftermath of the two World 
Wars; secondly, the dramatic increase in personal prosperity which has 
been experienced in every developed economy, leading to shodage of 
those prepared to undertake menial tasks and a corresponding increase 
in the demand for migrant workers. Thirdly, a dramatic declibe in the 
cost of long-distance travel, enabling non-European migrants io penet- 
rate metropolitan labour markets on an unprecedented scale. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War gaps in Britain's 
labour market were filled by several hundred thousand 'European Volun- 
tary Workers' recruited from Poland and the Ukraine. Following the 
erection of the 'Iron Curtain', migration from these sources came to 
a halt, and was rapidly replaced by an inflow from British posses- 
sions in Africa, the Caribbean and South Asia. Over the years this 
non-European inflow grew steadily in scale. As colonial subjects, the 
newcomers had an automatic right of entry into the United Kingdom, 
and at least at the outset little thought was given to the long-term 
consequences of their arrival, By the early 1960s this initial absence of 
mind had ceased to be sustainable. The demand for labour remained 
high, and numbers were rising rapidly, but there was no sign that the 
settlers were on the brink of return, and still less of their assimilation 
into the indigenous mainstream. Whilst the Confederation of British 
Industry insisted that in the absence of a steady inflow of migrants 
many factories would have difficulty in maintaining production, espe- 
cially at night, the Trades Unions viewed the steadily growing inflow 
with alarm. It was feared that employers would use access to cheap 
migrant labour as an opportunity to drive down wages of indigenous 
workers. 
In fact these fears were largely unfounded. On arrival migrants invari- 
ably took jobs which no one else wanted, and so were rarely in 
direct competition with indigenous workers. Nevertheless Caribbean 
bus-drivers and nurses were becoming an increasingly visible in London, 
as were Indian foundry workers in the West Midlands and Pakistani 
mill-hands in the Pennine region. Moreover their presence began to put 
pressure on other scarce resources, such as housing, prompting further 
fears of unwelcome competition. Whilst the Labour Party initially stood 
firm in the face of populist pressures, this principled stance cut little 
ice amongst its working-class supporters. Matters came to a head in 
the 1964 General election. A hitherto unknown Conservative running 
under the slogan of 'If you want a Nigger Neighbour, Vote Labour' 
toppled a leading Labour politician standing for a safe seat in the indus- 
trial West Midlands. Abandoning their earlier scruples, Labour joined 
the Conservatives in a competition to introduce more restrictive immig- 
ration policies. 'Shere appeared to be no other means of retaining the 
support of white industrial workers on which the party depended. 
Enoch Powell's intervention 
These developments brought 'immigration' to the forefront of political 
debate, with a consequent focus on the likely future course of 'race 
relations' in Britain. Breaking ranks with mainstream thought within 
the Conservative party, Enoch Powell emerged as the champion of those 
who demanded not just an instant halt to further immigration, but 
systematic repatriation of the unwelcome aliens. In his notorious 'rivers 
of blood' speech (1968), Powell chose to hang his arguments around 
recent efforts of local Sikh bus-drivers to be allowed to wear turbans 
rather than caps as part of their uniform. Having quoted a fellow Labour 
MP's remarks to the effect that 
'She Sikh communities' campaign to maintain customs inappropriate 
in Britain is much to be regretted. Working in Britain, particularly in 
the public services, they should be prepared to accept the terms and 
conditions of their employment. To claim special communal rights 
(or should they say rites?) leads to a dangerous fragmentation within 
society. 'This communalism is a canker; whether practised by one 
colour or another it is to be strongly condemned. 
Powell went on to insist that 
For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed 
in the Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. 
Here is the means of showing that the immigrant communities 
can organise to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign 
against their fellow citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest 
with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed have 
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provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the Roman, 
I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood'. 
(Powell 1968) 
Stripped of its rhetoric, the logic of Powell's argument is plain to see. 
Just as it had once been argued that if the Catholics would take a mile 
if they. were given an inch, he envisaged that the newcomers would 
likewise promptly gain a vested interest in 
the preservation and sharpening of racial and religious differences, 
with a view to the exercise of actual domination, first over fellow- 
immigrants and then over the rest of the population.. . Only resolute 
and urgent action will avert it even now. Whether there will be a 
public will to demand and obtain that action, I do not know. All 
I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal. 
(Ibid.) 
Although Powell's views were widely condemned as 'racist', careful 
inspection of his arguments show that he was in fact far more concerned 
with ethnic than with racial plurality. Moreover, in keeping with argu- 
ments which had been repeatedly articulated ever since the reformation, 
he gounded his case in the thesis that aliens could never be a part of 
the English nation, and that their presence threatened its very integ- 
rity. It was on this basis that Powell argued that legislation design d to e' bar discrimination was completely wrong-headed: instead he inyisted 
that further immigration should be brought to a halt, and replaced 
by a programme of publicly funded repatriation. Although his views 
were by now so extreme as to be regarded as intolerable by the Conser- 
vative Party - so much so that he was forced to relinquish his seat in 
Parliament - his arguments nevertheless attracted a great deal of popular 
support. They could no longer be ignored. 
Roy Jenkins' response 
In an era when Home Secretaries still sought to lead rather than defer .to 
popular opinion, Roy Jenkins challenged Powell head-on. insisting that 
the minorities could, would and should become integral components of 
British social order, Jenkins rejected as naive the suggestion that once 
immigrants had 'fitted in' they would abandon all aspects of their ances- 
tral heritage. Instead he sketched out an overtly pluralistic vision of the 
future course of integration, which should be understood 'not as a flat- 
tening process of assimilation, rather of equal opportunity, accompanied 
by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'. Although 
this vision remains prescient four decades after it was first articulated, it 
attracted remarkably little support, even in progressive circles. Despite 
his comprehensive rejection of Powell's nationalistic essentialism, even 
Powell's* most vociferous critics remained unimpressed. No less than 
their opponents, the prospect of plurality appears to have left them 
with feelings of acute unease, albeit on quite different grounds. No less 
committed to a unitarian vision of the future than Powell, his liberal 
critics argued that the migrants' problems stemmed above all from their 
condition of deprivation, precipitated in their view at least as much by 
the retrogressive parochialism of their cultural traditions as by their 
condition of material poverty. To those who adopted such a perspective, 
Jenkins' position appeared to be incurably romantic. Hence those on the 
left regarded the assimilation of indigenous ways as one of the migrants' 
most urgent priorities, on the grounds that this would open the way to 
progressive modernity. 
However well meaning their intention may have been, the 
consequences of their adoption of this line of argument were disastrous. 
First, Enoch Powell's core arguments remained unchallenged, whilst his 
central conclusion - that prospect of comprehensive assimilation was 
an illusion - was abusively dismissed as 'racist'. Secondly, and yet more 
seriously still, those who advanced such arguments made themselves 
hostages to fortune. If Powell was right and the minority presence did 
indeed precipitate ethnic plurality, the assimilationist ground on which 
they had taken their stand would be swept from beneath their feet. 
The rise and fall of anti-racism 
For the while that prospect still lay someway down the road. In the 
meanwhile once Powell and his many (mostly working class) supporters 
were defined as racist, it followed that those who opposed that position 
should identify themselves as anti-racist. In the event both racism and 
its antonym turned out to be exceedingly slippery concepts. Anti-racists 
took it for granted that they occupied the high ground; but how could 
they sustain that clairh? Were their arguments primarily moral, on the . 
grounds that racism was as irrational as it was wicked? Or were they 
primarily political? In the heated atmosphere of the 1970s those who 
argued that anti-racism was a political project soon found themselves 
facing acute problems. If racism .was an irrational manifestation of false 
consciousness, as was widely argued at the time, it followed that anti- 
racism was a component of wider agenda whose ultimate objective was 
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t o  overthrow fascism and capitalism. Amongst those who most vigor- 
ously supported such views were those who argued that as a result of 
their condition of super-oppression, black people could be expected to 
play a vanguard role in the coming revolutionary upsurge. The outcome 
was predictable. Whilst this far-left agenda proved attractive to many 
disaffected radicals who had participated in the student uprisings of 
the late 1960s) those onto whom they sought to  project the role of 
'vanguards of the revolution' soon realised that this agenda meshed 
poorly with their own experientially grounded interests and concerns. 
Other forms of ethno-racial and then of ethno-religious mobilisation 
proved to be far more to their taste. 
Whilst politically oriented anti-racism was steadily marginalised by 
lack of support, its more moralistic dimension continued to thrive. Once 
conceptualised as a poisonous mixture of ignorance, stupidity and sin, 
it followed that racism was best remedied not so much through political 
action, but rather through educational programmes which would enable 
those who had been seduced by racist ideologies to see the error of 
their ways. 'Anti-racism' became the theme of innumerable training 
programmes, so much so that many Local Authorities began to require 
all those seeking employment to  demonstrate 'a commitment to anti- 
racist and anti-oppressive practice'. But just what was the 'racism' of 
which trainees were expected to be aware? And rhetoric aside, just how 
was 'anti-racism' to be practised? 
Given its narrow conceptual foundations, all manner of issues were 
excluded from the anti-racist agenda. Two deficiencies were of particular 
significance. First, the absence of any reference to issues of ethnic plur- 
ality, and secondly any recognition that people of colour might have 
the capacity to set their own agendas. Hence far trom opening all the 
issues for debate, the narrow moralist framework within which almost 
all anti-racist initiatives were conceived effectively closed off discus- 
sion, on the grounds that the exploration of these allegedly diversionary 
issues was inherently racist. The outcome was often little more than a 
charade. Whilst a small minority of trainees could often be persuaded 
to accept the invitation to flagellate themselves in an effort to ellm- 
inate the last vestiges of original sin, most of those required to parti- 
cipate in such initiatives were far more sceptical. Although challenges 
to an agenda with which they were required to agree was disallowed, 
several escape routes were readily available. One option was simply to  
take the opportunity to gain the capacity to talk the talk - even if 
this had little impact on the way in which one interacted with people 
of colour. Nevertheless the acquisition of an anti-racist vocabulary did 
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make a difference: should trained anti-racists subsequently find their 
behaviour challenged, they were now in a position to produce waves of 
patronising verbiage highlighting their awareness of, and sympathy for, 
the plight of black people. Other escape routes were less sophisticated, if 
rather more popular. Having returned to the canteen after having been 
released by one's mentors, one could simply mock the political correct- 
ness of the ideas with which one had been required to agree (Ballard and 
Parveen 2007). 
In the face of such developments support for anti-racism steadily 
crumbled. Moreover the wider political agenda changed radically after 
MrsThatcher came to power in 1979: 'socialistic' notions such as anti- 
racism were in no way to her taste. Central government support for such 
initiatives-and indeed for any kind of targeted support for the new minor- 
ities- was soon withdrawn. Instead'multiculturalism', often in the form of 
unfocussed celebrations of the most superficial aspects of ethnic diversity, 
became the order of the day. With hindsight, the most salient feature of 
all these developments was their top-down perspective. Remarkably little 
attention was devoted to what the minorities were up to - or why. 
The development of ethnic colonies in post-war Britain 
Life was not easy when the first pioneers set about establishing themselves 
in Britain. In post-war Britain, finding a job, let alone a place t o  stay, 
was not straightforward. This was an era when notices announcing 'no 
coloureds need apply' were commonplace. However, in facing up to 
these challenges the newcomers were far from being the helpless pawns 
which the anti-racist agenda so often sought to suggest. Having made 
their way to Britain under their own steam, settlers took advantage 
of every available opportunity to establish self-constructed footholds 
in what was self-evidently a hostile terrain. Since gaining allies was 
crucial to survival, and since the natives mostly turned their backs, 
all the early settlers looked to others in the same position as them- 
selves as a source of guidance and support. Whilst fellow immigrants 
were normally willing to help each other out, relationships of recipro- 
city were Ear easier to construct, as well as much more resilient, when . 
established between those who shared some prior sense of common- 
ality. Hence whilst initial linkages were largely ad hoc in character, it 
was not long before those who shared some degree of linguistic and 
cultural commonality began to cluster together. In so doing they estab- 
lished the foundations for subsequent processes of ethnic crystallisation, 
a process which was strongly reinforced once chain migration began to 
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take off. Far from arriving in Britain as blundering pioneers, the majority 
of newcomers began to arrive with clear objectives in mind: to link up with 
friends and kinsfolk who had already established themselves in the United 
Kingdom. As they did so a whole series flourishing ethnic colonies soon 
began to emerge (Ballard 1994,2003). 
Whatever their origins, the trajectories of adaptation followed by 
each stream of migrants initially followed much the same pattern. New 
arrivals looked out for those of similar backgrounds: prior connections 
in the form of shared linguistic, religious and cultural codes, and better 
still immediate ties of kinship, offered a highly effective basis around 
which to construct networks of mutual reciprocity. Once in place, these 
networks enabled settlers to face the challenges of their new environ- 
ment on a collective rather than an individual basis. A dynamic of 
settlement began to emerge. As local ties of reciprocity became steadily 
more entrenched, temporary sojourners found themselves transformed 
into firmly rooted colonists, committed to reconstructing all the most 
significant social, cultural, religious, and familial institutions with which 
they were familiar back home. Such developments were not q iven  by 
nostalgia, nor by mindless 'tradition'. Rather they were highly adaptive 
in character: the resultant processes of community-construction were a 
highly effective means of facilitating survival in adverse circumstances. 
At the outset such initiatives were largely defensive in character. But as 
settlers began to feel more firmly rooted, they gained the confidence to  
assert themselves more openly. At the outset they had kept their heads 
down in the face of the exploitation and marginalisation; now they 
became increasingly willing to raise the heads above the parapet. 
Early awakenings 
Overt resistance initially emerged where the shoe pinched tightest of all: 
on the shop floor. Resentful about being allocated the hardest, dirtiest, 
most dangerous, and ill-paid jobs, people of colour began to challenge 
the processes whereby they were assigned to such tasks. As they did so it 
became clear that managers were rarely responsible for relegating them 
to such positions. This was a period when the Trades Unions were a 
powerful force on the shop floor, where shop stewards in a position to 
determine who was deployed to which task. In doing so they invari- 
ably favoured the union's white membership over those drawn from 
the visible minorities - even though most of them were also union 
members. During the late 1960s and early 1970s the resultant tensions 
reached boiling point: people of colour began to take collective action in 
an effort to challenge these practices. The confrontations so precipitated 
had a number of striking features. First, almost all were self-organised: if 
the local branch secretary and his immediate colleagues were the prin- 
cipal source of their difficulties, there was no point in challenging them 
through established union structures. Secondly, there was frequently 
an ethnically specific catalyst behind these initiatives, most notably in 
the form of the Jat Sikh-dominated (and largely communist-inspired) 
Indian Workers Association (IWA). Thirdly, their approach to rnobilisa- 
tion was one which consciously sought to unite all mng~iar  log (people 
of colour) - be they of Asian or Caribbean descent - the better to pursue 
their common interests Uohn 1969; Beetham 1970; Brooks and Singh 
1979). 
At the time these incidents attracted a good deal of attention, they 
were the first overt signs of collective self-mobilisation by people of 
colour. But as the 1970s progressed such challenges became steadily 
less frequent, and have by now been forgotten by almost everyone bar 
the participants. There were several reasons why challenges of this kind 
faded away. First, the industrial recession which followed Prime Minister 
Thatcher's assumption of power, together with the restrictions on indus- 
trial action which she imposed, gave those protesting 'from below' ever 
less space within which to manoeuvre. Secondly, the trajectories of 
adaptation followed by different sections of the minority population 
were becoming increasingly diverse. As Afro-Caribbean and South Asian 
communities began to move off in different directions, inter-ethnic 
alliances amongst people of colour became steadily more difficult to 
organise and sustain. Last but not least the majority of better-educated 
South Asian settlers (who provided the IWAs with their leadership) 
began to leave the shop floor to pursue more profitable opportunities 
elsewhere, thereby removing a vital catalyst from the industrial scene. 
As a consequence active resistance began to move away from the shop 
floor and onto the streets, and from an older to a younger generation. 
The resultant uprisings proved to be of far-reaching significance. 
The challenges to exclusion articulated from the early 1980s onwards 
differed sharply from those which erupted in the 1960s and 1970s. First, 
they were public confrontations -usually with the police -and normally 
occurred in the residential neighbourhoods where the protestors them- 
selves lived. Secondly, they were precipitated by a much wider range 
of grievances: initially local, but as time passed increasingly inspired by 
issues of national and indeed international character. Last but not least 
all the uprisings became ethnically specific: far from uniting all people 
of colour, they articulated the concerns of specific local communities. 
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With this in mind I have deliberately chosen to use the term intifada to 
identify such developments. Like their counterparts in Palestine, these 
uprisings emerged from the grass roots: they were not a product of 
careful prior organisation formulated from above. But in using the term, 
I d o  not wish to  glamorise such incidents: no one who has first-hand 
experience of an  intifada would do so. The damage they precipitate 
is immense, and the greater part of their costs and consequences is 
invariably borne by the protestors and their families. Nevertheless they 
convey powerful symbolic messages: that is why I have highlighted 
them here. 
The Afro-Caribbean intifada of 1981 
In January 1981, 13 Afro-Caribbean teenagers lost their lives in a 
house-fire in New Cross, apparently as a result of a Molotov cock- 
tail being thrown through the front window of the house &here a 
birthday was being celebrated. But in sharp contrast to the yave of 
public sympathy which an equally bloody IRA bombing in Ulster had 
precipitated a few days beforehand, the press and the police promptly 
blamed the local Afro-Caribbean community as the authors of their 
own misfortune. Hostility towards the local police was further exacer- 
bated as they continued to target young Afro-Caribbean men in a 
major stopand-search operation. The tinder was dry, and the fuse was 
soon lit. During the following summer confrontations erupted between 
the police and the young Afro-Caribbean men, first in inner London 
and then in other cities in which substantial Afro-Caribbean ethnic 
colonies had also crystallised. The police were ill-equipped to cope. 
Their command and control mechanisms broke down, their riot shields 
turned out not to be fire-proof, and before long the officers called out 
to  confront the protestors night after night were so tired that they 
could hardly stand. Had the troubles not subsided when they did, there 
would have been little alternative but to  call out the troops to restore 
order. 
Alarm bells promptly rang in both Whitehall and the press. Enoch 
  ow ell's prognostications appeared to be coming tru'e. Two major initi- 
atives were set in train. First, the Police were retrained and re-equipped 
for riot control; and secondly, substantial funding was made available 
to  Local Authorities under Section 11 of the Local Government Act, to 
provide them with (Financial) means of addressing the underlying stresses 
and strains. On the face of it this response was entirely appropriate: the 
new minorities had long been complaining about the poor quality of 
the public services, and the irrelevance of what was on offer to their 
needs. But whilst lack of ethnosensitivity in service delivery was a central 
focus of their complaints, the agenda within which the remedial initi- 
atives were conceived did not mesh with these concerns. As a result the 
greater part of the newly released funds were ploughed into 'community 
projects' designed to keep young people off the streets, whilst also 
providing employment opportunities for minority activists. Once so co- 
opted, it was hoped - often correctly - that their commitment to  political 
activism would diminish. 
At least as far as the Afro-Caribbeans were concerned, these initiatives 
appeared to have had the desired effect. Apart from isolated incidents 
such as that on the Broadwater Farm (a public housing project in north- 
west London) in 1985, where a police officer was bludgeoned to death 
in the midst of protests about a bungled arrest, there was no repetition 
of the multi-city intifada which erupted in 1981. Yet it would be idle 
to suggest that all is well on this front. Despite substantial efforts to 
retrain the police, relationships between front-line officers and young 
black men remain highly problematic to  this day. Meanwhile the Afro- 
Caribbean community has become deeply fragmented. Whilst its many 
Churches are a focus for resilience, especially for women, drugs'and 
gun-crime attract the attention of many (although by no means all) 
young men. By 2002 just under 11% of Britain's prison population was 
made up of people of African or Afro-Caribbean descent. Intifada has 
been replaced by incarceration. 
Pakistani Muslim intifadas 
Given that the participants in the 1981 intifada were overwhelm- 
ingly Afro-Caribbean, many commentators argued that as a result 
of their much more orderly cultural heritage, Indians and Pakistanis 
were unlikely to emulate their 'more excitable' Afro-Caribbean coun- 
terparts. That comfortable assumption fell apart in the uproar which 
followed the publication of The Satanic Ver.ses in 1989. The initial reac- 
tion was relatively low-key: Bradford Council of Mosques organised a 
public burning of Rushdie's novel t o  highlight Muslim disgust at its 
contents. But when neither the press nor the authorities nor even the 
Commission for Racial Equality displayed the slightest sympathy with 
Muslim concerns, protests escalated - only to be dismissed as an indic- 
ation of the inherent backwardness of the Islamic tradition, and of its 
6 followers' inability to appreciate the more sophisticated intellectual, 
N i t e r a r y ,  and cultural conventions of the contemporary world. For the 
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rising generation of young Muslims such a humiliating dismissal of 
their dearly held values was too much to take: in the face of public 
taunts, their initially well-ordered protests began to degenerate into 
violence. 
In the years that followed local incidents sparked of a whole series 
of small-scale intifadas, of which some of the most spectacular - and 
certainly the most publicised - were the so-called 'northern riots' which 
exploded in the former textile towns of Burnley, Oldham, and Brad- 
ford in the summer of 2001. Bungled efforts by the police to regain 
control over the streets in inner city residential areas in which ~aqistani 
Muslims had established tight-knit ethnic colonies precipitated polent 
resistance to the riot squad, whom local youths regarded as enem ocm- 
piers. In comparative terms the level of violence was relative1 t mild: 
it was much more limited than that which ensued when Caribbean 
youths took to the streets two decades earlier. Moreover this time the 
police were better prepared. Command and control remained intact, 
and well-trained and adequately-shielded riot squads soon reclaimed 
the streets. They also came equipped with video cameras, produ- 
cing evidence on the basis of which several hundred stone-throwers 
received substantial prison sentences (Carling etal. 2004). Neverthe- 
less the outcome was very different. In the first place improvements 
in video technology meant that images of burning cars in Oldham 
and Bradford were flashed around the world. Secondly, the perpet- 
rators were Muslims. Even though 9/11, let alone 717, were yet to 
occur, the events were widely publicised and precipitated a great deal of 
alarm. The authorities in Whitehall dispatched Tom Cantle, an experi- 
enced Local Government administrator, to investigate the causes of the 
disturbances. 
When Cantle and his colleagues returned to London to prepare their 
report, they appear to have been suffering from shell-shock. It was not 
so much the incidents themselves which disturbed them, but rather the 
depth of the ethnic divide out of which they erupted. This shines out 
from the opening paragraph of their report: 
Whilst the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city 
areas came as no surprise, the team was particularly struck by the 
depth of polarisation of our towns and cities. The extent to which 
these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects 
of our daily lives, was very evident. Separate educational arrange- 
ments, community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of 
worship, language, social and cultural networks, means that many 
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communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These 
lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and 
promote any meaningful interchanges. 
(Cantle 2002: 9) 
On the face of it, their observations confirmed Enoch Powell's prediction 
that non-European migration in general, and South Asian migration 
in particular, was bound to precipitate unbridgeable patterns of ethnic 
polarisation. But whilst Powell saw no solution other than repatriation, 
Cantle and his colleagues took a different tack: they concluded that 
efforts to bridge the divisions they had observed through the intro- 
duction of active policies of 'community cohesion' should now be the 
priority. Unlike previous reports on these matters, Cantle's was not 
placed on a shelf to gather dust. Instead it was promptly adopted as 
a central strand of government policy: every local authority received 
instructions to take urgent steps to promote 'community cohesion'. 
Policies designed to promote 'multiculturalism' suffered the same fate 
as those of 'anti-racism': they were swept aside. 
Before exploring the implications of the new policy - commitment to 
which was further reinforced in the aftermath of the events of 717 - it is 
worth pausing to consider the specific context to whose problems it was 
initially devised as a remedy. Bradford, Oldham, and Blackburn are once- 
thriving mill-towns into which migrant workers from South Asia were 
drawn in large numbers during the 1960s and 1970s. Most came from 
Mirpur District in Pakistan, or from Sylhet District in Bangladesh. By the 
time of their arrival the local textile industry was in terminal decline; 
it finally collapsed in the early 1980s. This had a disastrous impact on 
the local economy of the textile towns, since no alternative source of 
employment was readily available. No section of the local population 
was more seriously affected than the Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis, 
since they were overwhelmingly concentrated in this narrow sector of 
the labour market. 
Despite this setback, as a result of which virtually everyone lost their 
jobs, this was a period of rapid development within the local Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi'communities. Many men were in the midst of reuniting 
their families in the United Kingdom; despite everything they continued 
to do so, even if they had to use their hard-earned savings to finance 
the transfer. Hence the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a rapid growth of 
tight-knit and mutually supportive ethnic colonies in the close-packed 
streets of Victorian terraced housing in which the migrants had settled. 
'The reunion of families also led to a rapid growth of a locally born 
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second generation, whose members began to reach adulthood come 
the turn of the millennium. The virtual disappearance of opportunities 
for unskilled people, for people of colour with a limited command of 
English to gain access to waged employment had severe consequences 
for members of the older generation. Most found themselves perman- 
ently unemployed. By contrast many of their offspring successfully 
turned to self-employment as a means of earning an income. A multi- 
tude of comer-shops, restaurants, takeaways and taxi services opened 
for business, enabling members of still-burgeoning ethnic colonies 
to press their way forward, despite their initial copdition of severe 
disadvantage. \ 
However, their achievements were far from universally welcome. 
Whilst many of the newcomers' immediate neighbours, the largely 
indigenous residents of nearby council estates, had also been signific- 
antly disadvantaged by industrial collapse, their capacity to cope with 
adversity proved to be considerably less extensive than their Pakistani 
neighbours. However, rather than emulating the newcomers' commit- 
ment to frugality and collective reciprocity, by displaying a similar 
willingness to take entrepreneurial initiatives, most of their neighbours 
responded with feelings of jealous hostility. From their perspective, the 
fact that the despised newcomers appeared to be doing better than they 
seemed was deeply unjust. 
The indigenous perspective 
As far as most members of the indigenous population of Oldham, 
Burnley and Bradford are concerned, the familiar social order within 
which they grew up has disintegrated. As they see it, the unthink- 
able has happened: the 'immigrants' who originally arrived as unskilled 
and largely invisible night-shift workers have made substantial parts of 
the town their own; and having done so, they appear to be pulling 
ahead of the towns' 'real' inhabitants in material terms. How can this 
be explained? No matter how much objective observers may suggest 
, that the newcomers' achievements are the outcome of hard work, 
frugal lifestyles and the application of entrepreneurial talent, such argu- 
ments leave most members of the indigenous population unimpressed. 
Nowhere are such feelings of hostility more acute than in the 'sink' 
council estates which surround the emergent ethnic colonies. Already 
feeling betrayed by the powers that be, they routinely ascribe all their 
difficulties to the unfair competition from 'the Pakis', who in their view 
have been allowed to 'get away with it' by a supine state. Hence it is 
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regularly asserted that the minorities are disproportionately favoured by 
government-sponsored programmes which provide them with mosques 
and community centres, whilst 'we1, who have always lived here, get 
nothing. 'Pakis', it is consequently (if erroneously) argued, enjoy special 
privileges. 'They've even got a race relations law especially for them; but 
if we open our mouths to complain, we just get shouted down as racist.' 
Those who have reached such conclusions view the policies put forward 
by the British National Party with much favour. 
The Pakistani perspective 
Those on the other side of the fence dismiss these alleged 'privileges' as 
entirely fictional. Acutely aware that their achievements are the outcome 
of their own hard work, they point out that if the ghore (white people) 
are jealous of their achievements, they could follow in their footsteps if 
they wished. They are also sceptical about the benefits which have actu- 
ally accrued from the numerous urban regeneration schemes designed to 
assist the 'socially deprived'. From their perspective the impact of such 
initiatives have been largely symbolic. They may have provided many 
Asian youngsters with jobs as link-workers and teaching assistants, but 
the permanent benefits arising from them have been few. Constantly 
vulnerable to changes in Whitehall priorities (as, for example, when 
Section 11 funding was suddenly withdrawn), short-term bolt-on initiat- 
ives have done little to provide the (still overwhelmingly white) teachers, 
doctors, social workers, and police officers who continue to dominate 
the professional mainstream with improved levels of linguistic and 
cultural competence. Hence their capacity to provide effective services to 
their minority clientele remains as inadequate as ever. Although urban 
regeneration initiatives receive a great deal of publicity - provoking 
further ire amongst jealous white neighbours - the best that can be 
said about such programmes is that they have operated as job-creation 
schemes for restless youth. 
The tinder box explodes 
Cantle and his colleagues had every reason to highlight the depth of the 
polarisation with which they found themselves confronted. The under- 
lying contradictions had been brewing for decades. On the one hand 
large sections of the indigenous population were alarmed by what they 
saw as an alien canker emerging in their midst, and by the refusal of the 
powers that were to take cognisance of their concerns. Meanwhile the 
newcomers, and even more so their British-born offspring, were acutely 
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aware of the hostility that their presence generated amongst t eir white 
neighbours, and of the authorities' reluctance to take serious co 'inisance 
of their concerns. Recently a further explosive factor had been aMded to 
the brew. Whilst the older generation of migrants had come to regard 
the position in which they found themselves with resigned equanimity, 
members of the rapidly expanding British-born generation refused to 
accept their marginalisation. Suggestions that their colonies had become 
'no go areas' for outsiders were particularly irritating. As far as they 
were concerned, the parts of town which best deserved that appella- 
tion were the all-white council estates by which their settlements were 
surrounded. Asian families unfortunate enough to be rehoused on such 
estates invariably found the abuse to which they were subjected intoler- 
able, and promptly moved back into the safety of their own community. 
Meanwhile the late-night drinkers who form a substantial part of their 
clientele of their restaurants, and takeaways took it for granted that they 
had a right to abuse those who served them, whilst taxi-drivers unwise 
enough to demand payment from recalcitrant customers whom they 
had driven home to an all-white estate had much to fear. 1n a series 
of incidents well known within the community, but largely ignored 
outside it, such arguments had been settled by a resort to homicide. 
The tinder was dry and ready to burn. The initial spark may well 
have derived from reports in the press, and especially on BBC radio, 
suggesting that Muslim-majority areas in Oldham and Bradford had 
become no-go areas for whites - and indeed for Hindus. The British 
National Party promptly sought to raise the temperature. Rallies were 
organised in both cities, but only attracted a limited response. Then a 
small group of thugs staged a provocative incident. On the fringe of one 
of Oldham's major Pakistani ethnic colonies they insulted and assaulted 
two women. News of the incident quickly circulated by mobile phone, 
and a large number of young men went to defend the community's 
honour. By the time police arrived, the BNP thugs had left the scene; 
instead they encountered a gathering of angry young Pakistanis. It was 
at this point that the plot was lost. The most senior police officer in 
Oldham had recently been interviewed on the BBC, where he suggested 
that localities such as this were becoming 'no-go areas'. His prophesy 
promptly became self-fulfilling. As police poured reinforcements into 
the neighbourhood in an effort to regain control, its young residents 
vigorously resisted the alien incursion. After several hours of riotous 
confrontation the protestors were driven back indoors - but on the 
following day similarly structured confrontations erupted in Bradford 
and Burnley. 
Some analytical reflections 
On the face of it these uprisings did not pit the 'immigrants' and 'natives' 
directly against each other. Echoing similar confrontations involving 
the Irish settlers who arrived in industrial Lancashire more than a 
century beforehand, young Mirpuri men rose to the bait which had 
been provocatively dangled before them - and promptly got hammered 
by the forces of law and order. However, just as in earlier times, it 
would be wrong to assume that the police stood outside the underlying 
disjunction. Its officers, from constables to their commander, were over- 
whelmingly drawn from the majoritarian side of the ethnic boundary. 
Doubtless they had all attended racism awareness courses; but in the 
event they still acted as an army of occupation, displaying no obvious 
understanding of the possible motivations of the young men defending 
the honour of their homes, their families and their community. From 
this perspective the incidents which Cantle was sent to investigate were 
both a symptom of, and had yet further exacerbated, the contradictions 
which so alarmed him. 
At one level the contradictions with which Cantle and his team 
found themselves confronted were the outcome of a locally specific 
set of contingencies: no other part of Britain received such a heavy 
inflow of non-European migrants from a single rural source, suffered 
so badly from local industrial collapse or received so little infrastruc- 
tural investment to make good the resultant deficiencies. But whilst 
polarising processes which precipitated the intifada were consequently 
particularly acute, they were by no means unique to the 'northern 
cities'. Ethnic plurality is now a de facto characteristic of most 
British cities, and similar patterns of polarisation - governed in each 
case by specific local contingencies - can be detected everywhere. 
The issues highlighted by Cantle and his colleagues are a general 
, rather than a localised feature of the contemporary British social 
order. 
; A theoretical perspective: The dynamics of ethnic plurality 
Whilst Cantle does not seek to generalise in this way, a further feature 
of his argument is worth highlighting: the assumption that disjunc- 
tions with which he found himself confronted were unprecedented. 
He is clearly mistaken on this point. Britain's industrial cities have a 
long history of ethno-religious disjunctions of just this kind, and simil- 
arly structured patterns of polarisation can be observed throughout the 
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contemporary world. If so, it follows that his assumption that ethnic 
homogeneity (and its assumed correlate, 'community cohesion') is a 
normal state of affairs from which ethnic plurality can be regarded as 
an unfortunate deviation is seriously misleading. Empirical data points 
firmly in the opposite direction. 
Viewed from a less parochial, and less paranoid, perspective, ethnic 
plurality is much more a normal than an abnormal human experience. 
With this in mind it is worth turning to Furnivall's carefully argued but 
long overlooked account of the political economy of colonial South- 
east Asia, in which he set out a sophisticated analysis of the everyday 
operation of plural societies. For Furnivall, a plural society is one'in 
which 
two or more elements or social orders live side by side, yet without 
mingling, in one political unit. . .In its political aspect a plural society 
resembles a confederation of allied provinces, united by treaty.. .for 
certain ends common to the constituent units and, in matters outside 
the terms of union, each living its own life. But it differs from a 
confederation in that the constituent elements are not segregated 
each within its own territorial limits. In a confederation secession 
is at least possible without the total disruption of all social bonds; 
in a plural society the elements are so intermingled that secession is 
identical with anarchy. 
In a plural society, social demand is disorganized; social wants are 
sectional, and there is no social demand common to all the several 
elements.. . this.. . is the root cause of all those properties which 
differentiate the political economy of a plural society from unitary 
economy of a homogeneous society. 
Of necessity it raises the economic criterion to a new place in the 
scale of social values. There is one place in which the various sections 
of a plural society meet on common ground - the market place; and 
the highest common factor of their wants is the economic factor. 
They may differ in creed and custom, in the kind of music or style 
of painting they prefer; the members of different sections may want 
one thing rather than another; but if they want the same thing, 
they will all prefer to get it for twopence rather than for threepence. 
Individuals of all sections have in common.. .the economic motive, 
the desire for profit; and they all join.. .in forwarding the economic 
process. 
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[a further] characteristic of plural society is a sectional division of 
labour; although the primary distinction between the groups may be 
race, creed or colour, each section comes to have its own functions 
in production, and there is a tendency towards the grouping of the 
several elements into distinct economic castes. 
(Furnivall 1939: pp. 446-450) 
Furnivall drew most of his empirical material from his observation of 
Dutch-controlled Indonesia, where well-established Buddhist, Hindu 
and Islamic traditions were cross-cut by numerous more parochial 
disjunctions, and where the whole edifice had been overlaid by further 
disjunctions precipitated by the arrival of two rival sets of immig- 
rant entrepreneurs, the Dutch and the Chinese. No group occupied 
a position of comprehensive hegemony. Rather members of each of 
its component communities (including the soon-to-be-toppled Dutch 
colonialists) deployed their own distinctive moral and cultural agendas 
to order activities within the arenas which they were in a position to 
control. In the midst of all these diversities, it was the marketplace which 
ultimately brought these disparate components together: as Furnivall 
observed, trade across boundaries simultaneously united and divided 
all those involved. Hence the edifice was underpinned by a division 
of labour in which members of every component community found 
themselves in constant competition with, as well as being economically 
dependent on, all the others. 
Ethnic homogeneity and its alternatives 
Although Furnivall used his observations of developments in Southeast 
Asia as the foundation for his model, his theoretical perspective is of 
universal applicability. If so, the consequences are far-reaching: whilst 
pluralistic social orders of this kind remain as commonplace as ever, 
they stand in comprehensive antithesis to the ethnically homogenous 
nation-states which 'modernists' have come to regard as the only viable 
basis for the construction of a stable and harmonious social order. Ifon- 
ically, Furnivall completed his magnum opus just before the outbreak of 
the second of the World Wars, which were largely fought in pursuit 
of nationalist dreams of ethnic homogeneity. Moreover, despite the 
dreadful consequences of efforts to implement such dreams, especially in 
1 Nazi Germany, the hopeless pursuit of 'nation-building' has continued 
unchecked to this day. Formerly plural societies continue to break apart, 
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accompanied by endlessly repeated efforts to achieve a condition of 
homogeneity by means of 'ethnic cleansing'. Whilst the industrial-scale 
efforts to achieve that goal manifested in the gas chambers have not 
been repeated, the loss of life precipitated by outbreaks of organised 
homicide in a swathe of hitherto plural societies, including Punjab, 
Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia and now Darfur, has already 
surpassed that achieved in the European holocaust. 
The agendas underpinning these developments were rooted in similar 
principles. On the grounds that plurality would render their soci- 
eties socially, culturally, and politically unstable, ethnic homogeneity 
came to be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for national coher- 
ence. Precisely that vision also underpinned Enoch Powell's arguments; 
although few commentators have since been prepared to articulate that 
vision as clearly as he did, popular opinion in much of Euro-America is 
now moving ever more firmly in this direction. The currently favoured 
concept of community cohesion brings us back to precisely these issues. 
How much homogeneity is required to enable Britain - or any other 
contemporary society - to achieve social coherence? That some degree 
of commonality is a necessary prerequisite for viable social order is self- 
evident. Unless everyone in any given arena is agreed about which side 
of the road to drive on, chaos is inevitable. Likewise, without agree- 
ment about how commercial transactions should be ordered, and how 
arguments over matters of common concern should be negotiated and 
resolved, public order would collapse. But how far must agreement 
about common principles go to ensure that chaos can be avoided? Does 
it necessarily follow that everyone should routinely speak the same 
language? Is it essential for everyone to follow the same principles in 
organising their families and marriages? Should diversity be formally 
respected? And if so, in what spheres and on what basis and how far? 
With such considerations in mind, Cantle's position is comprehens- 
ively anti-pluralistic. With FurnivaII's formulation in mind, Cantle's 
description of a situation in which 'separate educational arrangements, 
community and voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, 
language, social, and cultural networks, means that many communities 
'operate on the basis of a series of parallel livesl'is entirely familiar. 
But instead of recognising that these contradictions are an outcome 
of differing interests as between subsections of the population, such 
that the equitable negotiation of conflicting interests would become a 
central goal of public policy, Cantle concludes that diversity itself is the 
source of the problem. Hence his advocacy of a policy of community 
cohesion. 
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An absence of community - or its mislocation? 
In a remarkable irony, Cantle did not find himself confronted with 
an absence of cohesive communities in his excursion to the northern 
cities, but rather a plurality of them. Moreover, as in the rest of urban 
Britain, the arena where a sense of community was at its weakest was 
not amongst the minorities, but rather amongst the poorer sections 
of the indigenous majority. Hence it is not so much the absence of 
community which the policy initiative would seek to remedy, but rather 
its mislocation. His model demands the destruction of communities in 
the plural and their reconstruction in the singular. Moreover, precisely 
because a sense of community is much more strongly sustained amongst 
the various minorities than it is amongst the indigenous majority, the 
processes of social reconstruction which he advocates would of necessity 
be ethnically specific in their impact. 
As in the rest of Britain, the indigenous residents of the inner-city 
council estates in Oldham and Bradford are not renowned for the 
strength of the local networks. Conventions of kinship reciprocity have 
been severely eroded by individualism and consumer capitalism, as 
well as a further paradoxical consequence of the welfare state: the 
collective structures which were once the backbone of English working- 
class communities have by now all but disappeared. 'Community' 
in indigenous working-class contexts is now but a shadow of its 
former self. 
The contrast with most sections of Britain's minority population could 
not be greater. Internal networks within most of the longer established 
groups such as the Jews and the Irish Catholics still flourish, and are yet 
stronger amongst their South Asian successors; indeed the biradari-based 
networks which underpin Mirpuri ethnic colonies in the Pennine region 
are amongst the tightest-knit of all (Ballard 2003). However, Cantle pays 
no attention to the extent to which ethnic consolidation has been a key 
feature in the trajectories of upward mobility which members of Britain's 
once marginalised immigrant minorities have so routinely traversed. 
The results of this deficiency are clear. In his analysis, as in those 
developed by the great majority of contemporary social commentators, 
the networks of inter-personal reciprocity around which ethnic colonies 
are constructed are not identified as a resource. Instead they are routinely 
dismissed as problematic, on the ground that they isolate those within 
them from contact with the indigenous mainstream. Cantle explicitly 
picks up this 'common-sense' view by highlighting a comment made by 
a Pakistani interviewee on the opening page of his report: 'When I leave 
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this meeting with you I will go home and not see another white face 
until I come back here next week.' 
How should this statement be read? Is it an empirically accurate 
account of everyday experience within local ethnic colonies, as Cantle 
suggests? Or is it no more than tendentious hyperbole? My experience 
suggests the latter. Despite the tight-knit character of local minority 
communities, I know of none in which white faces are entirely absent. 
Nor are their members entirely cut off from the wider social order. 
No matter how intense interactions within the biradari may be, their 
members regularly encounter members of the indigenous majority' as 
they take their children to school, consult GPs, go to work, go shop- 
ping in town or take a walk in the park. They routinely enter alien 
social arenas when they do, so social interactions across the ethnic 
boundary are a routine component of everyday life. 'The experience of 
most members of the indigenous majority is quite different. Even if they 
live in cities with a substantial South Asian presence, the great majority 
of white Britons rarely interact with people of colour; moreover, when 
such interactions do indeed occur, the terms of engagement are invari- 
ably one-way. 
Despite the inherently plural character of the British social order, the 
existence of ethnic diversity is routinely overlooked by most members 
of the indigenous majority. Hence when members of the ethnic minor- 
ities enter the ghore social universe, they are expected to suppress their 
distinctiveness and to order their behaviour in terms of indigenous social, 
cultural, and linguistic conventions. By contrast on the rare occasions 
when members of the indigenous majority traverse the ethnic boundary 
in the reverse direction, they rarely step right through it, because they 
have not acquired the social, linguistic, and cultural competence which 
would enable them to do so. Hence even when they cross the boundary, 
they find themselves unable to engage with those whom they encounter 
on their hosts' own terms. The exercise of hegemony is a personal as well as 
a structural phenomenon (Ballard and Parveen 2007). 
In hierarchically organised plural societies, cross-boundary transac- 
tions are invariably markedly asymmetrical. Whilst those at the bottom 
of the social order soon acquire a shrewd appreciation of the conventions 
deployed by the powerful, those in a position of privilege have little need 
to familiarise themselves with the ways of those whom they dominate. 
On the contrary they have every reason to dismiss them as mistaken. 
Cantle displays no awareness of this asymmetry. Instead he goes out of 
his way to suggest the disjunction is symmetrical, since he follows up 
the quotation from his Pakistani interviewee with another from a White 
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informant: 'I never met anyone on this [council] estate who wasn't like 
us from around here1. In my view this second comment is far more 
likely to be empirically accurate than the first: if only for reasons of 
safety, brown faces are rarely seen on council estates. In his efforts to 
highlight symmetry, Cantle misses a further crucial point: that even in 
sharply polarised societies interactions across ethnic boundaries occur 
'as a matter of routine, and are ordered in terms of a well-established set 
of social conventions. 
Ethnic groups and the construction of boundaries 
That such interactions are a key feature of plural societies is the core 
theme of Frederik Barth's classic study Ethnic Groups and Bo~lndaries. 
Roundly criticising the nai'oe assumption that ethnic groups maintain 
their cultural distinctiveness as a result of the absence of interaction 
between them, he produces extensive empirical evidence to show 
First.. . that boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them 
Secondly, one finds that stable, persisting, and often vitally important 
social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are 
frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statuses. In 
other words, ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of 
social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often 
the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built. 
Interaction in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation 
through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist 
despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence. 
(Sarth 1969: 10) 
Having explored the interactive character of plural systems, Barth 
dismisses the commonplace assumption that ethnic disjunctions are the 
outcome of primordial (and hence immutable) patterns of difference. 
Instead he argues that they are maintained by - and indeed the outcome 
of - dialectical interactions across mutually constructed boundaries. 
Moreover, once such patterns of ethnic interaction and differentiation 
are firmly entrenched, 'the ethnic boundary canalizes social life' (op. 
cit.: IS), so much so that 'ethnic identity is superordinate to most other 
statuses.. .and is thus imperative, in the sense that it cannot be disreg- 
arded and thus set aside by other definitions of the situation' (op. cit.: 
17). But in what sense is it imperative? Barth takes it for granted that 
power relations across such boundaries are rarely equal. Hence whilst 
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excluded groups can be expected to  close ranks as a means of self- 
defence, and to utilise their solidarity as the means of articulating their 
collective interests, those further up the hierarchy can be expected to  
use exactly the same tactics to marginalise their challengers, and hence 
defend their position of advantage. Hence ethnic closure is by no means 
a tactic deployed solely by disadvantaged minorities. Rather 'the bound- 
aries of pariah groups are most strongly maintained by the excluding 
host population' (op. cit.: 31). 
Yet, however stoutly defended the resultant disjunctions may be in 
conceptual terms, Barth follows Furnivall in arguing they nevertheless 
remain readily permeable: no matter how powerfully they may have 
been reinforced by mutual competition. Such cross-boundary transac- 
tions are an everyday occurrence in the I'ennine region. Most minority 
businesses attract a large non-minority clients: many could not survive 
without them. Minority families routinely access educational and health 
care services, shop in city centre stores, and access (often on an extended 
family basis) mainstream leisure facilities. Members of the locally born 
younger generation are yet more familiar with indigenous ways: most 
work for mainstream employers, and regularly use the same leisure facil- 
ities as their indigenous peers. 
An analysis informed by Furnivall and Barth's insights highlights 
the shallowness of Cantle's understanding of the issues. This is not 
to suggest that the disjunctions which caused him such concern are 
fictitious. Far from it: their consequences are only too real. The most 
serious deficiency in his analysis is his failure to recognise that far from 
being the outcome of a lack of inter-ethnic contact, the disjunctions 
he observed are the outcome of competitive interactions across them. 
What renders those interactions problematic is not lack of contact, but 
the lack of symmetry in the organisation of those contacts, and above 
all the character of the rules of engagement which members of the 
indigenous majority routinely seek to impose. These routinely disregard 
the linguistic, conceptual, and cultural conventions deployed within 
the minorities' ethnic colonies, and also insist that when members of 
such communities emerge into public arenas they should order their 
'behaviour, speech and self-presentation in 'acceptable' terms: those 
routinely deployed by members of the hegemonic majority. In this scen- 
ario the minorities' commitment to ethnic alterity, even when restricted 
solely to domestic contexts, is immediately identified as pathogenic. Far 
from being identified as an asset, it is routinely perceived as a source 
of self-induced social disadvantage. Such arguments are steadily being 
expanded. As demands for homogeneity become more insistent, those 
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who choose different way can find themselves accused of betraying their 
basic obligations of citizenship - as in the case of the Hispanic popula- 
tion of the United States. 
7/7 and its consequences 
All these issues came to a head when four young Muslims from the 
Pennine region blew themselves up on the London Transport system 
on 717. 'Their motivations were grounded as much in a belief that 
Muslims were being systematically marginalised and oppressed on a 
global scale as they were in more parochial British contexts. Moreover, 
in sharp contrast to the less spontaneous uprisings by which they were 
preceded, their actions were carefully pre-planned. Nor can their actions 
be described as 'popular': the vast majority of British Muslims regarded 
the carnage they precipitated with horror. But although the perpetrators 
consequently stood out on an extremist limb, the attitudes and exper- 
iences which caused them to behave as they did were a product of 
the processes described here. Hence the sentiments which underpinned 
bombers' actions were immediately appreciated by the great majority of 
young British Muslims, even if the consequences of their display of their 
anger and despair were simultaneously regarded as being overwhelm- 
ingly counterproductive. 
With this in mind the atrocities the bombers had the effect of making 
a crucial symbolic point: the consequences of contradictions highlighted 
in this chapter are by no means restricted to the bari1ieue.s of Britain's 
northern cities, nor were they in any way historically unprecedented. 
Guy Fawkes hatched a similarly explosive plot four centuries previously, 
which would have had yet more devastating consequences for the capital 
if it had not been discovered in time. Disputes about religious pluralism 
are nothing new in English history. 
A singular or  a plural future? 
Where next? No matter how attractive dreams of a singular future may 
be, issues of plurality, and the contradictions to  which they give rise, 
can no longer be brushed under the carpet. Neither anti-racism nor 
laicite' offers viable solutions to the underlying problems. Nor does the 
demonisation and delegitimisation of difference offer any kind of solu- 
tion. Efforts to repress diversity in contexts of plurality merely reinforce 
the determination to differ. If so, what are we left with? Now that all 
other solutions appear to be unviable, it is worth re-examining what 
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has hitherto been described as the multicuItura1 approach, above all to 
identify just how and why it is deemed to have 'failed'. 
With this in mind it is worth reminding ourselves that one of the 
reasons why the concept was embraced in the first place was that it was 
perceived as a more easy-going, less aggressive and hence more palat- 
able alternative to the confrontational arguments pressed forward by 
the anti-racists. To the extent that understandings of multiculturalism 
emerged from visions of the rainbow delights of 'multi-culti', they were 
bound to fail: the political and strategic challenges thrown up when the 
de facto reality of ethnic pluralism challenges dreams of national homo- 
geneity are far too deeply rooted to be resolved by soft options. Hence 
for the proponents of multi-culti the events of 9/11 marked the end of 
an era, and those of 717 punched nails into their project's coffin; but 
far from acknowledging that this might have occurred because of the 
inadequacy of their vision, most fair-weather multiculturalists simply 
blamed the terrorists for letting them down. Piqued by this betrayal, 
they have proved only too ready to line up behind visions of community 
cohesion. 
Our inspection of Cantle's understanding of community cohesion has 
served to reveal its inherent flaws. Whilst all plural societies need to estab- 
lish a viable basis on which to negotiate social cohesion as between their 
component parts, attempts to impose cohesion by demanding conformity 
to a single religious, linguistic, cultural, and moral ideology are bound to 
fail. The unilateral imposition of homogeneity in contexts of plurality can 
only be expected to sharpen underlying contradictions, and hence precip- 
itate an increase in heterogeneity. That said, no plural society can operate 
without some means of ordering cross-boundary transactions. Since no 
business can be done in the absence of a common transactional code, a 
negotiated lingua franca invariably emerges in plural contexts. The English 
language is a classic example of just such a lingua franca. 
If outright war is to be avoided, the core issue is what the contents, 
the scope, and above all the symbolic character of such a common trans- 
actional code should be. Negotiation is the core issue: there is no more 
effective recruiting sergeant for polarisation than attempts to impose 
hegemonic solutions. With this in mind it follows that aspects of our 
current democratic conventions, and especially the expectation that the 
will of the majority should normally prevail, stands in urgent need of 
qualification. A pluralist vision would not only support Muslim girls to 
wear the hijab to school if they so wished, but also resist the imposi- 
tion of restrictions on those who wished to use hounds to hunt foxes. 
A viable condition of plurality must not only recognise that diversity is 
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an ever-present dimension of human affairs, but also be underpinned 
by a presumption of a right to direr, even when the behaviour in question 
is significantly at odds with established conventions. 
It goes without saying that this right could not remain wholly untram- 
melled: even the most plural societies are of necessity underpinned by a 
restricted number of common conventions. That said, a commitment to 
plurality demands that such requirements are kept as parsimonious as 
possible. In doing so it also follows that the liberal dream of identifying 
a singular set of universally applicable moral principles around which 
'the good life' can be constructed must also be set aside, to be superseded 
by a recognition that every moral system is culturally grounded, ethnic- 
ally specific and hence non-universal in character (Gray 2000). If it could 
be accepted that moralistic hubris, no matter how well intentioned, is 
inherently oppressive, many of our current dilemmas would be far easier 
to resolve. If political and cultural compromise became the order of the 
day at every level in the socio-political order, the 'threat' of plurality 
would simply evaporate. Once humanity regains its capacity to acknow- 
ledge and respect difference, our current tendency to regard diversity as 
the enemy of solidarity could be steadily whittled away, opening the 
way for the emergence of societies in which everyone could feel at ease 
within 'a community of communities' as Parekh (2000) felicitously puts 
it. In so far as the objective of community cohesion is to 'help micro- 
communities to gel or mesh into an integrated whole.. .[and] to develop 
common goals and a shared vision' (Cantle 2001: 70), it stands at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from Parekh's vision. 
Conclusion: Ethnic plurality and the challenge of the 
twenty-first century 
The new millennium may well prove to mark a turning point in human 
affairs. The nineteenth and the twentieth centuries were an age of nation- 
alism, during which the world's empires fragmented into ever more 
numerous national components, each of which sought stability and 
justice in the context of separate visions of ethno-national homogeneity. 
As we enter t.he twenty-first century, unitarianism is provingan impossible 
dream. The costs of secession and the attendant processes of ethnic 
cleansing are manifestly unacceptable, whilst the exponential growth of 
long-distance migration is undermining all efforts to construct ethnic- 
ally homogeneous nation-states. That Euro-America should find the 
resultant contradictions acutely challenging should come as no surprise. 
It was European thinkers from Hegel onwards who initially provided the 
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philosophical basis for dreams of national homogeneity, and their ideas 
were exported to the remainder of the globe during the nineteenth- 
century age of Empire. As we enter the twenty-first century Euro-America's 
position of global hegemony is fading fast. Millions of non-European 
settlers have established themselves in the former heartlands of the 
Imperial order, such that alarm bells have begun to ring across the length 
and breadth of Euro-America. Populist movements demanding a halt to 
further (non-European) immigration, the better to sustain our (already 
irretrievably flawed) condition of ethno-national integrity have emerged 
on all sides. Yet despite the steady globalisation of the world order, nation- 
alist dreams of unitarian homogeneity continue to exercise as powerful 
a hold over Euro-American imagination. Still committed increasingly 
hubristic expectations of both local and global hegemony, the prospect of 
living in conditions of religious, linguistic, and ethnic plurality continues 
to be regarded as a dreadful prospect. 
The time has come for a re-think. Our unitaria* dreams have passed 
their sell-by date. The goal of comprehensive ethnic homogeneity - call 
it 'modernity' if you will - is proving to be unreachable, and its pursuit 
is precipitating ever more bloody consequences. If our taken-for-granted 
assumptions are leading us into the wilderness, it is time to turn around. 
We have much to unlearn. Our un-modern ancestors found plurality 
far less bothersome to live with than we do. What went wrong? In our 
doggedly unitarian pursuit of 'modernity' and 'progress', some salient 
truths about our human condition have been swept aside. Three of the 
most obvious include the propositions that 
as cultured beings, we humans have an infinite capacity to create the 
terms of our own existence, and to do so in extraordinarily varied 
ways; 
although we share many commonalities, there is not, is unlikely to 
be and certainly never has been a single vision of 'the good life' to 
which all humans adhere; 
whilst everyone holds their own vision of the good life in high 
esteem, any attempt to forcibly impose that vision on others is asking 
for trouble: more often than not such effort will simply reinforce 
those alters' determination to pursue their own course. 
When our ancestors began to construct towns and then empires, they 
were never so foolish as to attempt to render them ethnically homo- 
geneous. Whilst all pre-modern states included a hegemonic elite whose 
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members occupied position of enormous privilege, the successful rulers 
of the far-flung Empires of antiquity never sought to eliminate all 
traces of ethnic, religious, and linguistic plurality from amongst their 
subjects. That would only invite rebellion. Instead all they demanded 
was acknowledgement of and respect for Imperial authority. The epithet 
'render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's' promised his subjects a great 
deal of personal autonomy, provided they accepted the legitimacy of 
the overarching Roman umbrella. In a post-9/11 context it also worth 
remembering that all the historical Islamic Empires were markedly plural 
in character. To be sure every Sultan looked on his Muslim subjects with 
special favour, but that certainly does not mean that Jews, Christians, 
Zoroastrians and Hindus were system~tically excluded from positions 
of power and privilege. Moreover, whatever stories of Muslim besti- 
ality may have been circulated in western Europe since the failure of 
the crusades, it was the Latin Christians, rather than their opponents, 
who were for Long the most enthusiastic exponents of Holy War and 
conversion by the sword. Hence as Sachedina demonstrates in his illu- 
minatingly titled volume The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism, the 
ferocious visions of Islamic unitarianism through which contemporary 
jihadis legitimate their actions have much shallower historical and ideo- 
logical roots than do those of the Washington neo-cons who have taken 
advantage of the assault on the twin towers to launch a global re-run of 
the crusaders' agenda under the banner of a War on Terror. 
Building on key Qur'anic messages which insist, amongst other things, 
on the unity which underpins all the variety found in God's created 
world, such that all of Adam's offspring will stand as equals - regardless 
of gender and tribal affiliations - when they are ultimately called to 
account for their doings during the course of their sojourn on earth, 
Sachedina concludes that in historical terms the Islamic vision of a just 
society has never been as monolithic as the majority of its contemporary 
ideologues so mindlessly insist. Instead, the focus of the Islamic social 
message has been to make human beings aware of their true potential, 
to overcome self-cultivated weaknesses that prevent them from dealing 
with others with justice and fairness. Islam seeks to remedy these weak- 
nesses by improving inter-human relations and emphasising people's 
civil responsibilities towards one another. The challenge for Muslims 
today, as ever, is to tap the tradition of Koranic pluralism to develop a 
culture of restoration, of just intra-religious and inter-religious relation- 
ships in a world of cultural and religious diversity. Without restoring 
the principle of coexistence, Muslims will not be able to recapture the 
spirit of early civil society under the Prophet (Sachedina 2001: 138-9). 
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Democracy, especially when formulated within the context of a 
nationalist framework, swept such pluralistic understandings to  one 
side. Once plurality was defined as a challenge to national integ- 
rity, the only reasonable response to diversity was to seek its elimin- 
ation. However, it was not democracy per se which precipitated that 
outcome, but rather the majoritarian basis on which nationalists invari- 
ably insisted that it should be interpreted. Democratic orders which 
leave no  space for diversity will of necessity be regarded as oppressive 
by those who differ; and efforts to suppress those ditferences invari- 
ably sharpen rather than eliminate the underlying disjunctions. In these 
circumstances the remedy is not to back away from the principles ot 1 
democracy, but rather to temper simplistic majoritarianisrn with a recog- ! 
nition that accepting the consequences of ethnic plurality is a necessary 1 
civic virtue. As a leading American theorist of the imperatives of plurality 
argues, this will require urgent steps to encourage. 
i 
I 
i 
a wide diversity of religious faiths, sensual habits, household organ- 
izations, ethnic traditions, gender practices, and so on, and [to1 
encourage the civic virtues of pluralism to inform relations between 
these constituencies. Rut a democratic pluralist won't willingly, 
for instance, allow the state to torture prisoners; murder to go 
unpunished; parents to deprive their children of an education; 
the public school system to deteriorate; wealthy citizens to evade 
taxes; orphaned children to be placed under the care of incom- 
petent adults; adult citizens to be unemployed for too long; the 
gap between the real cost of living in a system and the income- 
earning ability of most citizens to grow large; the income hierarchy 
to become too extreme; or narrow unitarians to take charge of the 
regime.. . . a  diverse culture is one in which pluralistic virtues of 
public accountability, self-discipline, receptive listening, gritted-teeth 
tolerance of some things you hate, and a commitment to justice are 
widespread. 
(Connolly 2005: 43) 
The pursuit of such strategies wil1,never be easy. In comparison with the 
clarity of the unitarian nationalist's vision, plural societies are grounded 
in endless compromises and hard-driven bargains. To modernists in 
search of clear-cut solutions, all this will appear impossibly chaotic. But 
is there any viable alternative? The orderly world of which unilateralists 
dream can only be achieved by taking exclusivist positions in which 
alternative perspectives are eliminated. But as current developments 
constantly remind us, the consequences of so doing in an inescapably 
plural global order are exceedingly severe. As we enter the twenty-first 
century the central challenge facing humanity is the re-establishment 
of respect for difference. If we could regain the capacity to d o  so, we 
would have a much brighter prospect of responding with equanimity to 
the conditions of ethnic plurality which surround us, no less globally 
than locally. We all have much to re-learn. 
Notes 
1. I happily acknowledge my debt to Michael Ilanton as the coiner of the first 
of these terms, and to William E. Connolly as the source of the second. If 
'presentist' refers to the anachronistic misthke of seeking to read past events 
in terms of present-day suppositions, 'unitarian' refers to those who make the 
parallel mistake of assuming that only non-plural societies can ever be viable. 
2. Although England was one of the world's first nation-states, it always hrmly 
rejected republicanism. Hence i n  formal terms Ilritain's population still 
remain subjects of the Crown rather than citizens. The only Act dealing expli- 
citly with UK citizenship was passed in 1981, and is primarily concerned with 
identifying those who do, and those who do not, have unquestioned rights 
of entry and abode in the United Kingdom. 
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